Fusion or thermonuclear power is a promising, literally endless source of energy. Development of fusion power is still in investigation and experimentation phases and a number of fusion facilities are under construction in Europe. Since fusion energy is innovative and fusion facilities contain unique and expensive equipment an issue of their reliability is very important from their efficiency perspective.
INTRODUCTION
In general, the purpose of the reliability and risk analysis is to provide support in making correct management decisions by evaluating the reliability and risk associated with a set of decision alternatives. The classical definition of the risk of failure is as follows:
where R is the risk of failure, p f is the probability of failure and C is the cost caused by the failure. The measure of the failure cost may be different (depending on various consequences). For production plants (including a nuclear power plant) it is usually not only the cost of failure (and accident in the worst case) and repair but also the amount of lost production (e. g. electricity) and lost profit. Risk can be reduced from a level R to a lower level R' either by reducing the loss given failure or by reducing the probability of failure, or even by reducing both parts [1] . On the other hand, such risk reduction requires some investments and should be taken into account during the analysis. The values Δp f and ΔC should be selected in such a way that the risk reduction ΔR is achieved at minimal costs.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the reliability, as the main ingredient of safety (antonym of the risk), could be analysed for systems of fusion devices and show the practical application and results of such analysis by the possibility to reduce the risk and the cost related to the risk. In the Fusion power section, we will review the approaches of the reliability analysis used for fusion facilities; the section Reliability analysis of fusion facilities is devoted to a short survey of methods and techniques used for the analysis; in the section Overview of methods for analysis we will demonstrate the results of these methods practical application as a case study for the Divertor Target Cooling Circuit ACK10 of the Wendelstein 7-X experimental fusion facility.
Fusion power Fusion power development in Europe
There are several fusion experimental installations in Europe operating or being constructed, or yet planned to be constructed. The aim of the European fusion research programme is developing nuclear fusion as an energy source, i. e. developing the knowledge in physics, technology and engineering required to design and build fusion power plants [4] . The roadmap towards a fusion reactor relies on three facilities: Joint European Torus (JET), its successor, an International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), see Fig. 1 [5], and a demonstration reactor called DEMO.
JET represents a pure scientific experiment. The ITER project aims to make long-awaited transition from experimental studies of plasma physics to full-scale fusion power plants. Construction of the ITER began in 2007, and the first plasma is expected to be produced in 2020. The ITER fusion reactor itself has been designed to produce 500 megawatts of output power for 50 megawatts of input power, or ten times the amount of energy put in. The machine is expected to demonstrate the principle of producing more energy from the fusion process than that used to initiate it, something that has not yet been achieved with previous fusion reactors. But it will be only a scientific demonstration; the ITER will not generate any electricity.
The next foreseen facility, DEMO, is expected to be the first fusion plant to reliably provide electricity to the grid.
Wendelstein 7-X
The Wendelstein 7-X (W7-X), see Fig. 2 , is an optimized stel larator experiment which shall demonstrate the pos- sibility to use such a system as a nuclear fusion power plant [6] . The project is in the assembly and preparation for a commissioning phase at the Max-Planck-Institut für Plasmaphysik (IPP) in Greifswald, Germany. The Wen delstein 7-X will start operation step by step in 2014, the first plasma is expected in 2015.
The purpose of the Wendelstein 7-X is to evaluate the main components of a future fusion reactor built using stel larator technology, even if the Wendelstein 7-X itself is not an economical fusion power plant. The Wendelstein 7-X, when finished, will be the largest fusion facility created using the stellarator concept. It is planned to operate with up to 30 minutes of continuous plasma discharge, demon strating an essential feature of a future power plant: continuous operation.
The Wendelstein 7-X is mainly a toroid, consisting of 50 non-planar and 20 planar superconducting magnetic coils, 3.5 m high, which induce a magnetic field that prevents the plasma from colliding with the reactor walls. The 50 nonplanar coils are used for adjusting the magnetic field.
The main components are the magnetic coils, cryostat, plasma vessel, divertor and heating systems.
Reliability analysis of fusion facilities
Power plant availability is essential from the economical perspective as both fission and fusion power plants require very high initial investments. Returning of the investment and earning profit require the plant to generate the highest possible amount of electricity and this implies high availability requirement. High availability of experimental fusion facilities is required for the most efficient use of the facility for experiments.
A conceptual study of future commercial fusion power plants (FPPs) has been performed with a Power Plant Avai lability (PPA) study aimed at identifying the aspects affecting the availability and generating costs of FPPs [2, 3] . Among others, availability and reliability issues of FPPs were covered by the study. The study concludes that in order to be competitive, fusion plants starting from the first generation need to comply with the availability factor greater than 80%, similar to existing fission plants, with very few unplanned shutdowns. In order to guarantee continued safety of operation during fusion plant lifetime, in-service inspection and maintenance are needed and this aspect should be taken into consideration in the design of the systems [2, 4] .
ITER RAMI approach
The availability objective for ITER is 60% inherent availa bility and 32% operational availability [3] . The in herent availability is the percentage of time during which the machine would be available if no delay due to the scheduled maintenance or supply was encountered. The operational availability reflects the inherent design inc luding the effects of maintenance / upgrade delays taking into account the availability of maintenance personnel and spares and other non-design factors.
The ITER organization uses the RAMI (Reliability, Avai lability, Maintainability, Inspectability) approach to per form a technical risk assessment. The RAMI approach focuses on the operational functions required by the operation of the ITER rather than on physical components. It enables to define the requirements for the operational func tions and provide the means to ensure that they could be met.
The RAMI process begins during the design phase of a system because corrective actions are still possible. The process is focused on the functions required to operate the ITER and their failure criticality. It is performed in 4 steps:
• Functional Analysis (FA); • Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA); • Risk mitigation actions; • RAMI requirements.
A functional analysis of the systems is performed with a functional breakdown (top-down description of the system as a hierarchy of functions) and an assessment of reliability and availability performance of the functions by using Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs). The RBD approach uses the function blocks (FB) as a basis, but concentrates on the reliability-wise relationships between the function blocks. The input data, such as mean time between failures (MTBF) and mean time to repair (MTTR), are fed to the lowest level blocks.
A FMECA is performed in parallel to the RBDs to list the function failure modes and evaluate their risk level. A decision whether to accept or mitigate the failure mode is made based on the risk level. FB and RBD are input to FMECA.
Risk mitigation actions are initiated in order to reduce the risk level of the failure modes identified by the FMECA. After integrating RMA, new RBDs are prepared.
RAMI requirements are outputs of the ITER RAMI process. They are integrated in the system requirements:
• Availability and reliability targets for the system and main functions according to the project requirements.
• Required design changes that need to be integrated to improve the current design.
• Specific tests to be performed on the components or systems.
• Operation procedures and specific training to lower the risks when operating the machine.
• Maintenance requirements in terms of a list of spares, intervals of inspection and preventive maintenance, procedures and training.
• Proposals for standardization of common parts used in great numbers in the project, as ensuring inter-changeability of spares in the design of the systems shall then allow for shorter maintenance operation (rep la cement of consumables, repairs of failed components) and shall reduce the downtime of the systems and the severity ratings in the FMECA, reducing the risk level and allowing for more availability of the ITER for the experimental programme. The process applied for the analysis of the plant systems defines failures of the functions, their criticality and provides risk mitigation actions. Up to 2010 RAMI was applied to 16 out of 21 main ITER systems. The analysis performed for the Tokamak Cooling Water System [5] identified initially 27 major risks, such as failure of the main pumps, leaks on the heat exchangers or associated valves leading to loss of cooling and possible damage for the plasma-facing components and failure of the coolant chemistry control leading to corrosion. For such major risks risk mitigation actions are considered which reduce either the likelihood (prevention) or the consequences (protection) of the fai lures. The analysis proves that after implementation of the identified actions the cooling system could be operated in higher reliability and availability at 97.7% as required by the project.
The RAMI analysis for the ITER fuel cycle system [8] identified several failure modes with high risks, majority of which were removed by implementing risk reducing means. However, some most critical risks remain, e. g. se veral critical components of the tritium plant, which are not easily replaced or repaired.
Up to date the ITER project is probably the one which achieved the biggest advance in systematic use of reliability and risk analysis methods for a fusion facility.
Approach used for W7-X IPP has decided to use the RAMI approach for the W7-X. As the W7-X at that time was already in the manufacturing and assembly state, it was too late to make significant design changes. Therefore it was decided to perform a reliability analysis based on modelling of already existing systems and then provide recommendations for improvement of system reliability and availability. This approach is different from the one used for ITER where the overall ITER availability goal is "distributed" among the systems and is defined for the systems and components (top-down approach). For the W7-X, on the contrary, it was decided to use the "bottom-up" approach when the existing system availability is estimated and improved. Ideally, a full-scope analysis would enable to obtain the overall W7-X availability as a summary of all systems availabilities. Having such a complete model would enable seeing how improvements of each system design, operation, maintenance, inspections, etc. would improve both systems and overall W7-X availability.
In order to perform reliability / availability and risk analyses of the W7-X probabilistic safety assessment methods were used.
Overview of methods for analysis Main methods for assessment
To estimate risk a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), which is typically used for nuclear power plants, can be applied for any hazardous systems, e. g. [9, 10] . PSA methodology integrates information about facility design, operating practices, operating histories, component relia bilities, humans' behaviour, thermal hydraulic fa cility res ponse, accident phenomena and potential envi ronmental and health effects. PSA is widely used for esti mation of safety and reliability of energy generating complex systems.
A Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) together with an Event Tree Analysis (ETA) are two main tools in a system analysis. Both methods include a quantification part and visual representations of the Boolean logic for accident sequences [11] . FTA is an analytical technique, whereby an undesired state of the system is specified (usually a state that is critical from a safety or reliability standpoint), and the system is then analyzed in the context of its environment and operation to find all realistic ways in which the undesired event (top event) can occur. The fault tree is a graphic model of various parallel and sequential combinations of faults, caused by hardware failures, human errors, software errors, or any other pertinent events, that will result in the occurrence of the predefined undesired state. The FTA attempts to develop a deterministic description of the occurrence of an event, called the top event, in terms of the occurrence or non-occurrence of other (intermediate) events. Intermediate events are also described further until the lowest level of the detail, the basic events, is reached.
A fault tree analysis may be qualitative, quantitative, or both, depending on the objectives of the analysis. Possible results from the analysis could be the following:
• A listing of possible combinations of environmental factors, human errors (if included), normal operational events, and component failures that may result in a critical state of the system. • The probability that the critical event will occur during a specified time interval. As a result of the fault, tree initial qualitative analysis minimal cut sets (MCS) are generated. A cut set is a set of basic events which, if occurred, definitely lead to the top event. A minimal cut set is a cut set such that after removal of any basic events from it there is no more a cut set. When the fault trees are structured, the MCS generations and quantification for a quantitative analysis are made by the PSA software.
Importance and sensitivity
In order to better understand the influence of each component and each parameter on the total system re liability / unavailability and risk the importance and sensitivity analyses are performed. The importance measures are the following:
The Fussell-Vesely (FV) importance for a basic event is the ratio between the unavailability based only on all MCSs where the basic event i is included and the nominal top event unavailability is
where
is the FV importance; Q TOP is the nominal top event unavailability; Q TOP (MCS including i) is the unavailability based only on MCSs where the basic event i is included.
The risk decrease factor (RDF) is calculated as
where I D i is RDF; Q TOP (Q i = 0) is the top event unavailability where the unavailability of the basic event i is set to zero (the basic event does not contribute to the top event unavailability).
The risk increase factor (RIF) is calculated as follows:
where I I i is RIF; Q TOP (Q i = 1) is the top event unavailability where the unavailability of the basic event i is set to one (the basic event does contribute to the top event unavailability).
The fractional contribution (FC) is calculated as follows:
The sensitivity S is calculated as a ratio between "sensitivity high" and "sensitivity low" indicators:
where "sensitivity high" Q TOP, U is top event results where the unavailability of the basic event i is multiplied by a sensitivity factor (normally equal to 10); "sensitivity low" Q TOP, L is the top event results where the unavailability of the basic event i is divided by the sensitivity factor. The importance calculations for parameters are cal culated according to a similar procedure as for basic events. In some cases, importance measures cannot be defined, or would be meaningless. This is the case for time to the first test (TI) parameters, and for a risk increase factor for frequency (f) parameters.
• The parameter value is set to the "best theoretically pos sible", in all cases it is X = 0. This is made for all parameter types except for time to the first test (TF) parameters.
• A new top event result (unavailability or frequency, de pending on the type of calculation in the MCS-analysis specification) is calculated. This new, lower, result is indicated with Q TOP (X = 0) in the following formula. The risk decrease factor can now be calculated as follows:
The fractional contribution is the following:
• The parameter value is set to the "worst theoretically possible". It is different depending on the type of the parameter, it is q = 1 for probability parameters and X = ∞ for all other parameters. This is not applicable for frequency parameters because an infinite frequency value would imply an infinite top event frequency.
• A new top event result (unavailability or frequency, depending on the type of calculation in the MCS-analysis specification) is calculated. This new, higher, result is indicated with Q TOP (q i = 1) below. The risk increase factor can now be calculated as follows. For probability parameters:
For all other parameter types X (except frequency (f) and time to first test (TI) parameters for which no calculations are made):
Case study: Wendelstein 7-X divertor target cooling circuit The divertor target cooling circuit is a part of the water cooling circuits for the W7-X. It provides cooling flow for the target modules during plasma operation and ensures water circulation during other operational modes. It also provides heating up of the divertor target modules up to 150 °C (the so-called baking mode) before starting operation campaign after outage for maintenance. The cooling circuit consists of a primary part (ACK10 cooling circuit) and a secondary part (ECB10 water supply system). The circles are separated by two parallel heat exchangers. The secondary part cools the primary part during the experiment and holds its temperature constant.
The primary part includes a cooling circuit and a se parate baking circuit with its own pump and provides water to 110 parallel target modules.
The pipes with diameters of 25-600, the valves and other components are stainless steel parts. Water for the primary part must be deionised. The total water content of the primary part is about 87 m 3 . The content of a lockable target module is about 25 litres.
A simplified flow diagram of the DTCC [12] is provided in the following Fig. 3 .
Fault Tree Model
The top event of the fault tree is "ACK10 unavailable for experiment" (Fig. 4) . This FT consists of five branches which model failures of five sections of the DTCC. Each fault tree models failure of different parts of the DTCC. The fault tree "No water from pumps AP002, AP003" is described below as an example. Fig. 3 . Simplified flow diagram and 3D schema of W7-X DTCC [12] Cooling water circulation in the ACK10 system [13] is ensured by pumps AP001, AP002, AP003 (Fig. 5) .
Two pumps are required to provide sufficient cooling for Normal Load and Full Load operation modes. Only one pump AP003 is installed now and AP002 is planned to be installed. Installation of AP001 is under consideration and it is possible that this pump will not be installed and only two pumps will be in operation. Each pump line is equipped with the following:
• Manual gate valve KA505 (504) is normally open and is closed only for pump maintenance; • Pump AP003(002) may be in operation or in standby;
• Check valve KA508(507) is opened when the pump is running and closes due to the pressure difference when the pump stops; • Pneumatic valve KA510 (511) is opened when the pump is running and closes due to the automatic signal when the pump stops. Most of the time the DTCC system will be in Part Load and Standby modes which correspond to pauses between W7-X experiments and non-working time, respectively. Cooling water flow rates for these modes are 425 m 
Analysis results
A reliability analysis of the DTCC (ACK10) was performed using the FTA and RiskSpectrum PSA software. The developed FTA model quantification includes minimal cutsets generation and an uncertainty and sensitivity analysis. The calculation was performed for the time period of 6 526 hours, i. e. the total time of operation campaigns per one year. The MCS generations for the analysis are made by the PSA software. The calculated total unavailability for the ACK10 operation period in a year is 0.188. This means that the system will be unavailable for 18.8% of the operation campaign. As a result of the ACK10 model analysis 56 minimal cut sets were generated. The most important 7 MCS (which gives the highest unavailability) are presented in the following Table 1 ; the remaining MCS bring only 0.01% to the total unavailability.
The results show that due to low system redundancy the failure of a single component may lead to complete system unavailability. More than 50% influence on the system unavailability brings the failure of an auxiliary (secondary) cooling pump AP002 which has a high quantity of cyclic loads. About 35% bring the pneumatic valve KA510 located at the pressure line of the same pump. This valve is also subject to high cyclic loads.
In order to better understand the influence of each component and each parameter on the total unavailability the importance and sensitivity analyses were performed.
The results of the importance and sensitivity analyses for the most important 7 basic events are presented in the following Table 2 . It is obvious that the most important basic events are related to the minimal cut sets. The interesting outcome is that importance and sensitivity measures show how total unavailability would change if reliability of each component changes. For example, RDF shows that assuming "perfect" pumps with failure probability equal to 0 (1st basic event), this would decrease ACK10 unavailability 1.84 times and a "sensitivity low" indicator Q TOP, L shows that increasing pump's reliability 10 times, ACK10 unavailability would be 11% against current 18.8%.
The results of the importance and sensitivity analyses for parameters are presented in the following Table 3 .
The final results show that the most important contributor to the system reliability is not equipment failure rates but one month time period for hardware repair or replace ment which was assumed (parameter ONE_MONTH). The "Sensitivity low" indicator Q TOP, L shows that decreasing this time 10 times would result in ACK10 un availabi lity 
